Politic Analytics

Pre-election arithmetic. Part 3. Party of regions

For the Party of regions the campaign 2007 will be easier and more difficult at the same time than for its main rivals. Easier - because its victory is forecasted with a high probability in “individual championship”. More difficult – because it will ultimately have to compete with itself during the campaign.

Key targets
The main struggle for the Party of regions will deploy after the elections while creating a coalition. And then it will be important to have enough votes. The result of the Party of regions in 2006 was caused by the party’s being in the opposition and the protesting electorate fancied it. The situation has changed during a year: PR has become a party n power with all electoral disadvantages which are typical for this status. The analysis of different experts’ opinions allows defining the following key targets of the PR in this election campaign.
1. To keep and to increase - 2. The main intrigue of this campaign will be a fight for the second place between the mega block of “Nasha Ukraina” and BJuT which result will substantially define not only a candidature of the Prime-minister but also allow outlining a format of a future coalition. In this situation for the Party of regions claiming the right for forming a coalition and the government the quantity of votes, which it will be able to gain, will be the key issue of the September reelection. The critical result for the PR can be considered 30% of votes. The less it will be, the more challenging will be for the party the forming of a coalition. From the angle of regions the PR can count on increase of the electoral support and first of all in regions where the population is disappointed in local authorities, the majority of which consist of the BJuT representatives. Consequently, as in the situation with BJuT, the key target of the Party of regions at the future elections is a retention (or probably an increase) of the results 2006.
2. Drop of dead weight or Universal soldier – 2. The problem of geography broadening is bound up with the problem of the party’s universalization. During last years the PR was frequently criticized for its monoregionality. Now the Party of regions has to face the same contradiction again, which is vital for its further evolution: at the new elections it could become a core of some block combining responsible experts from different regions of the country or, as an alternative, inscribe a definite part of these people in its election list. Or it will become a party of one region again, although it is the most significant industrial region in the country.
The solution of the problem of its current allies can contribute to the universalization of the Party of regions and, consequently, to broadening of its geography. The necessity to agree with allies and to share with them, the necessity to secure or help to secure their interests only prevented the PR in governing the country. It is more practical, pragmatic and strategically more correct to create a union of managers and technocrats who are able to govern the country really and clearly in difficult conditions. That is why the next key target, which the Party of regions will have to solve during the future campaign, is to demonstrate its main point as a party of all social sections and regions refined from tactical allies.

Disadvantages
The analysis of the experts’ opinions and evaluations allows defining the following circumstances which can complicate the solution of the key targets of the Party of regions.
1. The Party of regions has reached its high, it has realized the minimum program (coming to power) but because of lack of clear and understandable maximum program it threatens with “self-criticism” and using a passionate potential of the party for the internal confrontation.
No matter how the Party of regions is demonstrating the solidarity of its ranks, the information about growing contradiction between two most powerful “donetskije” leaks out into mass media from time to time. Victor Janukovich and Rinat Ahmetov see differently the future of the party and the participation of the PR in the future pre-term elections. Consequently, V. Janukovich and R. Ahmetov had a different attitude to the President’s initiative to discharge the parliament and to set pre-term elections. The prime-minister in fact headed the “party of war” against the reelection. In his turn Rinat Ahmetov was not interested in exacerbating the political situation which would have obviously affected his business. Many observers explained the May armistice between the presidential team and “regionals” exactly as a result of successful negotiations of R. Ahmetov and ex-secretary of SNBOU V. Gajduk.
The main lines of difference inside the PR are: firstly, contradictions between “old” and “new donetskije”. By the end of 2006 at least three groups of influence had formed in the Party of regions: the group of R. Ahmetov (about 60 deputies plus the governing body of the faction, plus one ministerial post and the posts of heads of the natural state monopolies), the group of Kljuev – Azarov (about 65-70 deputies plus the control over the greater part of the Cabinet) and the group of V. Janukovich (about 60 deputies plus the governing body of the Cabinet). The prominent representatives of that part of the party gravitating towards Janukovich had held key posts in the government and in the parliamentary faction of the PR. At the same time the part of the party oriented to R. Ahmetov considered its coming to leading positions as premature a year ago (they needed to get their bearings in the Rada’s lobby at first). Now the representatives of this group are ideologically ready to more active participation in governing the party and probably Ukraine as well. Secondly, there were suppressed conflicts between “donetskije” and “non-donetslije” (“luganskije”, “kharkovskije”, “oddeskije”, “Crimean”, “denpropetrovskije”, “zaporozhskije” and others) party groups of influence. First of all it meant discrepancy of their representatives’ roles in the party with their ambitions.
2. The list of the PR is a very significant element of the pre-election race. In spring 2006 the “regionals” brought 186 deputies into the Rada counting on 150 posts at most. Nowadays the situation is being complicated by the increased (in comparison with the previous elections) quantity of those who wish to fill up the list of the Party of regions and also by the reluctance of some party activists to loose it. If it is theoretically supposed, that by the unfortunate result the “regionals” will run risks of loosing some quantity of mandates, it will mean exacerbating competition within the party for passing posts in the list. Besides, the “regionals” still having staff hunger will involve skilled staff from outside, by that strengthening the internal competition even more. Two main groups of influence in the party could purposely search for allies from outside for reinforcing their positions within the party. Hence, the forming of the list could have definite destructive potential.
However, despite of all disagreements among the party’s leadership the election campaign will certainly unite the “regionals” and before summing-up of the elections these disagreements will not be made public. It is senseless to stake on disagreements in the party between the “line of Janukovich” and the “line of Ahmetov” as a source of the split in the party especially during the pre-election period. Such contradictions could, with definite but not high probability, “break off” the party inside but only in case if it had been stably in power for a quite long time.

Advantages
In general, the experts’ community agree in opinion that first of all the high electoral rating, powerful financial and administrative resource remain on the side of the Party of regions.
Firstly, having consented to the elections, V.Janukovich and his team have achieved the postponing of the voting to more convenient for them time. Besides, now the elections will be carried out not only according to the President’s Decree but also in compliance with the parliament’s resolution. If the coalition had not resisted, it would not have lost a part of its electoral support. And now the “white-blue” have time for not only regrouping the ranks, forming new lists, but also for increasing pensions and salaries via the government, reducing surprise effect from the side of the pro-presidential forces.
Secondly, resisting the prime-minister and the coalition has not allowed a clear political and electoral victory of V.Jushchenko. It would have given grounds for strengthening of the presidential power.
Thirdly, the “regionals” have achieved modifications of the election law convenient for them and got an acceptable for them staff of the CEC. In exchange for a concrete date of the elections and changes in the State budget concerning the financing of the extraordinary elections, Victor Jushchenko has made a number of concessions: he has adopted amendments to the act about elections which were initiated by the members of the coalition, has inserted representatives of the Party of regions in CEC securing the majority of voices in it to the members of the coalition.

Campaign policies
It is rather difficult to forecast which policy will prevail in the election campaign of the Party of regions. In general, at least three variants of it can be outlined.
The first variant is a “soft line” which is followed by the part of the Party close to Rinat Ahmetov. It is virtually the repetition of the last election campaign (under the slogan “Improvement of your life already today”) with enumeration of successes of the government of Victor Janukovich, increase of social aids, appeals to integrity of the country, non-admission of civil confrontation etc. But even here special stress will be laid on the following: “we could have improved your life even better but for the illegal dismissal of the Verkhovna Rada by Victor Jushchenko”.
The second variant is a “hard line” which is followed by the “party of war” among the “regionals”. The confrontation will be conducted in the spirit of the presidential elections 2004 applying dissident slogans, accusations of Victor Jushchenko and his surroundings in usurpation of power, breaching the Constitution of Ukraine and the split of the country, promises in case of victory to realize the procedure of impeachment etc.
The third variant could be a deliberate wracking of the election in the East of Ukraine which is controlled by this political force in contravention of agreements about the date of the elections on the 30th of September. It is sabotage of forming of the election committees and in case of forming different actions for disruption of their work. As a result the elections will not take place or will be declared illegal in the East, and this will aggravate the split of Ukraine and may lead to co-existence of two parliaments, two coalitions, and two governments. This variant is convenient first of all for Rinat Ahmetov and his business-surroundings who need stability.

Summary
Consequently, in the cross point of the key targets and also strong and weak points of the Party of regions lays the necessity of keeping the result 2006 by simultaneous geographical and ideological broadening of electoral and representative base and reorganizations within the party.

July 24, 2007 // Material according to publications of the Ukrainian Internet-editions prepared by A. Ljashenko